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1787: THE CONSTITUTION AND "THE CURSE OF
HEAVEN"
WALTER E. DELLINGER III*
On Thursday, July 5, 1787, the Constitutional Convention, hav-
ing recessed for two days in honor of Independence Day, resumed
its deliberations, then nearly at deadlock over the allocation of
power between large states and small. As the convention
threatened to break apart, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania
gave voice to the hopes and fears of the delegates. "He came here,"
Madison recounts Morris as saying, "as a Representative of
America; he flattered himself he came here in some degree as a
Representative of the whole human race; for the whole human race
will be affected by the proceedings of this Convention."1 We may,
in our time, seriously doubt whether Morris and his colleagues
could in any meaningful sense "represent the whole human race";
we cannot doubt, however, that the whole human race was to be
affected by the Convention's proceedings. "The Country," Morris
went on, "must be united. If persuasion does not unite it, the
sword will .... The scenes of horror attending civil commotion
can not be described .... The stronger party will ... make
traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter will finish the
work of the sword."'2
The framers who met at Philadelphia were moved not only by
such apocalyptic fears, but by hopes as well, and by visions of the
grandeur and importance of America. To review the work of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, as reflected in James Madison's
extensive daily notes, beginning with the first day, May 25, and
continuing day by day, draft by draft, through the Philadelphia
* Professor of Law, Duke University. This article began as a comment presented in
March 1987 at the Fourth Annual Bill of Rights Symposium at The College of William and
Mary. It evolved in a series of lectures in the spring of 1987 delivered in New Orleans,
Washington, and New York City to federal judges and members of the bar. Except for not-
ing quotations and acknowledgments, I have left this largely in the form of those lectures.
1. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 529 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter Farrand].
2. Id. at 530.
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summer until the Convention, its work completed, finally rose on
September 17, is to enter into another time and place, and to gain
a sense-clouded, obscure, partial to be sure-of a truly extraordi-
nary event in human history. A study of the unfolding architecture
of the Constitution exposes the reader to statecraft of the highest
order. One sees, in the records of this Grand Federal Convention,
political debate of a quality that leaves one embarrassed by the
comparative poverty of the public discourse of our own generation.
The work produced during these four months was a Constitution
whose writ yet runs, and now reaches from Philadelphia to the
Arctic Range of Alaska.
The Convention was the work of men who even in their own
time were seen as unusually gifted. The French charg6 d'affaires
wrote to his government as the meeting convened: "If all the dele-
gates named for this Convention at Philadelphia are present, we
will never have seen, even in Europe, an assembly more respectable
for the talents, knowledge, disinterestedness, and patriotism of
those who compose it."3 Their work has lasted longer and served
better as a foundation for free government than any other consti-
tution ever written.
And yet, when the proposed Constitution was first revealed to
the public and sent to state conventions for ratification or rejec-
tion, it produced one of the most savage and divisive political con-
tests in American history. It was at first defeated in North Caro-
lina, and it passed by only a handful of votes in the critical states
of Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts-states in which sup-
porters of ratification literally had to come from behind to win rat-
ification by votes on the order of 89 to 78 in Virginia4 and 30 to 27
in New York.5
To those of us accustomed to the subsequent sanctification of
the Constitution, the question naturally arises: "What did the op-
ponents see that was so wrong with the Constitution?" This is not
an idle question. If we are to learn something from the bicenten-
3. 3 Farrand, supra note 1, at 15. This letter is translated into English and quoted in C.
ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION 138 (1966).
4. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at
654-55 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter Elliot's DEBATES].
5. 2 id. at 413.
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nial of the Constitution, and if it is to serve as an occasion for
renewal of a constitutional faith, not only do we need to attend to
the virtues and arguments of those who drafted and supported the
Constitution, but we should listen as well to the voices of those
who opposed the Constitution and very nearly succeeded in defeat-
ing it. More importantly, we should reflect, by our own political
and moral light, on those things that were wrong about our consti-
tutional founding, even as we celebrate that which was profound,
enduring and wise.
At the conclusion of my remarks, I want to recall those legacies
of our constitutional founding that for me are most enduring: the
institution of republican government, the vision of nationhood, and
the very concept of constitutionalism itself. But in order to avoid
an undue romanticization of the Constitution, let me begin by dis-
cussing the most troubling aspects of our constitutional origins: the
framers' deep ambivalence about popular democracy and the
founding generation's constricted view of who counted as a person,
a constriction that reached in apogee in the Constitution's accom-
modation with the institution referred to by one delegate as "the
curse of heaven."6
Listen, for a moment, to the framers' debate on May 31, 1787,
when the Convention had not yet been sitting a week. The issue
being discussed was whether the national House of Representatives
should be elected by the people. According to Madison's notes, the
debate proceeded as follows: "Mr. Sherman opposed the election
by the people. . . . The people, he said, (immediately) should have
as little to do as may be about the Government. They want infor-
mation and are constantly liable to be misled."7 Mr. Randolph of
Virginia "observed that the general object [of the Constitutional
Convention] was to provide a cure for the evils under which the
U.S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man
had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy. ' 8
These statements reflect the fact that one central issue in the
minds of many of the framers was the need to curb the "excesses"
of the state legislatures. In a real sense, the "problem" to which
6. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 221.
7. 1 id. at 48.
8. Id. at 51.
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the Convention was called in response was the problem of democ-
racy-democracy in the state legislatures that was unchecked by
any other power." In the revolutionary ferment of 1776, and under
the simple and democratic constitutions of that year, the middling
and some lower classes-yeomen, farmers, mechanics-had
achieved direct representation in the state legislatures. 10 To
Madison, and to many of those gathered at Philadelphia, these
newly constructed state legislatures exhibited the "inconveniences
of democracy"" that flow from the expansion of the franchise. The
populist, pro-debtor legislation enacted in many of the states was
seen as a threat to vested rights and to what Madison candidly was
to call in the tenth Federalist the "different and unequal faculties
[that persons have] of acquiring property.' 1 2 As the delegates gath-
ered in Philadelphia, rumors circulated that the Rhode Island as-
sembly was considering legislation providing for the equal redistri-
bution of all property every thirteen years. The framers' fears of
popular democracy and the strain of anti-egalitarian sentiment in
the Convention can be seen in the remarks of Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts: "The evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy. . . . [H]e was still . . . republican, but had been
taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit."'13
What are we to make of this? Was the Constitution a repudia-
tion of the revolutionary spirit of 1776, an aristocratic document
designed to benefit the few and the wealthy, as its opponents
charged? Or did it fulfill the revolution by establishing a mature
republican government that could preserve private rights, maintain
stability, and facilitate progress?' 4 These are questions that were
not fully resolved in the ratification debates, nor have they been
fully resolved in the two centuries that followed. They reflect a
continuing dialogue in American political thought between the
competing and often conflicting ideals of popular democracy, on
the one hand, and vested rights on the other.
9. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 7
(1980).
10. Id. at 12.
11. 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 135.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
13. 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 48.
14. See Wood, supra note 9, at 3.
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If there is a unifying theme to the Convention, it is the quest for
the proper remedies for the threat of tyranny by legislative majori-
ties. To Madison and others who supported the adoption of the
Constitution, one of its great advantages was that it replaced the
more simple and more direct democracy of the state legislatures
with an overarching, complex government, national in scope, that
provided for a filtration of popular views through men of suppos-
edly greater learning and sophistication. In our own time, however,
many are likely to respond with some sympathy to the arguments
of the opponents of the Constitution, such as Willie Jones in North
Carolina, Melancton Smith in New York, and Patrick Henry in
Virginia, patriots too, but largely lost to history. 5
One of the provisions of the proposed Constitution to which its
opponents most strongly objected was the small size of the na-
tional House of Representatives. Fighting against ratification in
New York, Melancton Smith argued that this size-sixty-five
members for a nation of three million, with each congressman rep-
resenting 46,000 people in districts that covered a vast terrain,
would never be able to represent-that is, literally, to re-pre-
sent-the people themselves.' 6 There were more than a thousand
state legislators in those thirteen loosely allied states. They were
elected annually to packed legislative halls from small constituen-
cies made up of friends and neighbors who very often knew them
personally. With the adoption to the proposed Constitution, power
was shifting from these state legislators to sixty-five national con-
gressmen and twenty-six senators. In arguing against the creation
of a national government in which these few legislators would each
represent tens of thousands of voters, Melancton Smith revealed a
conception of representation that rested on a vision quite different
from Madison's. He spoke as follows:
The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we
speak of representatives, is, that they resemble those they re-
present. They should be a true picture of the people, possess a
knowledge of their circumstances and their wants, sympathize in
all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests.
15. See H. MAYER, A SON OF THUNDER. PATRICK HENRY AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(1986). Mayer's compelling biography of Patrick Henry will redress this imbalance. Id.
16. 2 Elliot's DEBATES, supra note 4, at 249.
1987] 149
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The knowledge necessary for the representative of a free people
not only comprehends extensive political and commercial infor-
mation, such as is acquired by men of refined education, who
have leisure to attain to high degrees of improvement, but it
should also comprehend that kind of acquaintance with the
common concerns and occupations of the people, which men of
the middling class of life are, in general, more competent to than
those of a superior class.1"
As an example, Smith noted: "To exercise the power of laying
taxes ...with discretion, requires something more than an ac-
quaintance with the abstruse parts of the system of finance. It calls
for a knowledge of the circumstances. . . of the people-a discern-
ment how the burdens imposed will bear upon the different clas-
ses."18 He then argued that from these huge national congressional
districts spanning great distances, only a famous planter or promi-
nent person of great repute could be elected. "A substantial yeo-
man of sense and discernment, will hardly ever be chosen. . . . [I]t
appears that the government will fall into the hands of the few and
the great."'"
If the opponents of the Constitution were for simple, popular
democracy, and government as close to the people as possible, does
it follow that the Constitution and those who framed and sup-
ported the Constitution were antidemocratic? That would be too
simple a rendering of Madison's views. Madison was, to be sure,
troubled by turbulent democracy in the state legislatures, and by
the threat it represented to rights of property and contract and to
other individual liberties. The problem with simple direct democ-
racy, in his view, was tyranny by the majority. The great object for
Madison was "[t]o secure the public good and private rights,
against the danger of [the majority] faction, and at the same time
to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government." 0 He
did not believe that the cure for the "follies of democracy" was to
be found in excluding the people from the government altogether.2'
In that early June debate, the source of those startling denuncia-
17. Id. at 245.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 246-47.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 61.
21. 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 51.
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tions by many delegates of the "follies of democracy," Madison ar-
gued successfully for having the people themselves elect the House
of Representatives. Madison was, in his words, "an advocate for
the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive fil-
trations, but thought it might be pushed too far"22 and the people
lost sight of altogether. "He thought too that the great fabric to be
raised would be more stable and durable if it should rest on the
solid foundation of the people themselves ... 23
For Madison, the mediated Constitution, with its filtration of
popular views, represented the last, best hope for the survival of
republican government. Although the framers of the Constitution
did not fully share the populist views of their opponents, they at
least recognized that a just government ultimately had to rest on
popular consent-an idea that was itself relatively unique in the
world of nations in the eighteenth century. Those who drafted the
Constitution and supported its ratification did not by any means
reject the bedrock principle of the consent of the governed. That
principle, after all, was what both sides were fighting for in the
battle over ratification.24
As we celebrate the bicentennial of the Constitution, we need to
recall that the immediate success of the Constitutional Convention
rested in part on one literally unspeakable compromise of princi-
ple. The issue of slavery did not simply slip past an inattentive
Convention. For much of the Convention the delegates dared not
speak slavery's name as they dealt with those who were euphemis-
tically referred to as "three fifths of all other Persons,"25 but the
division over slavery burst upon the Convention in late summer
when Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania delivered a thunderous
attack on the what he called "the curse of heaven. '26 In his notes
for August 8, Madison wrote:
The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly
explained comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S.C.
who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id.
24. See Berns, Does the Constitution "Secure These Rights?," in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE
CONSTITUTION?, supra note 9, at 75.
25. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from
their dearest connections & dam[n]s them to the most cruel
bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protec-
tion of the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa or N.
Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a
practice.2"
Now one might legitimately ask why one should even talk about
slavery on the occasion of the bicentennial of a Constitution from
which this particular stain has long since been removed. My re-
sponse is that both slavery and race have had an enormous impact
on the development of the American Constitution, and we cannot
fully understand our present constitutional conflicts over the per-
missible use of race unless we understand the role of race in our
constitutional origins and throughout our constitutional history. It
is also important to view our constitutional tradition with a modi-
cum of humility, and to do that we must never lose sight of the
fact that our Constitution was, in this respect, conceived in original
sin.
The critical moment came on August 29. The Southern states at
the Convention wanted to guarantee their freedom to import yet
more slaves from the coast of Africa. The New England states
wanted Congress free to enact, by simple majority, "navigation"
legislation to provide protection to the New England shipbuilding
and shipping industries-protective legislation that would be
costly to the exporting South. Perhaps, it was suggested, if sent to
a committee, these subjects-slavery and navigation-might form
the basis of a bargain." And so they did. 9 The two-thirds require-
ment for navigation legislation was dropped,30 Congress was pro-
hibited from interfering with the importation of slaves before the
year 1808,'31 and the slave trade clause was subsequently en-
27. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 222.
28. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 374. The suggestion was made, surprisingly, by
Gouverneur Morris, who had previously expressed opposition to slavery in the strongest
terms of any delegate to the convention. Id.
29. Id. at 400.
30. Id. at 453.
31. Id. at 414-15.
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trenched, immunized from the amendment process until the year
1808.32
Before the business was finally done, however, one last provision
was added. Before quoting this provision, let me note that
throughout the process of drafting the Constitution, every draft of
every provision used the pronoun "he." It is a commonplace obser-
vation that "he" is used in the Constitution in its generic sense as
encompassing both genders. This is, of course, technically true.
But this next draft provision casts a very different light on the
Constitution's use of the pronoun "he." For this provision, adopted
unanimously for the next-to-last draft of the Constitution, uses the
phrase "he or she." Although the pronouns drop out altogether
from the final wording of this provision of the Constitution, it is
nonetheless extraordinary to find the Convention unanimously
adopting a draft provision using the phrase "he or she." At the
conclusion of the compromise over navigation and slavery, Mr.
Butler moved to insert the following clause: "If any person bound
to service or labor in any of the U-States shall escape into an-
other State, he or she shall not be discharged from such service or
labor . . . but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming
their service or labor."33 Throughout the Constitution and all its
drafts, "he" is used to refer to President, Vice-President, Senator;
"she" appears but once in the evolving drafts of the Constitution,
and "she" can be one, and only one thing: a fugitive slave.
What did the Constitution mean for human freedom? The adop-
tion of the Constitution meant that for the first time there would
be a national union in which free states were under a constitu-
tional mandate to return fugitives back into slavery. The impor-
tance of this was not lost on the Southern delegates. In their report
to the Governor of North Carolina, written the day after the Con-
vention adjourned, the North Carolina delegates cited, as one of
the advantages of the proposed Constitution, that "[t]he Southern
States have also a much better Security for the Return of Slaves
who might endeavour to Escape than they had under the original
32. Id. at 559.
33. Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added).
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Confederation." 34 Moreover, with the new Constitution, there
would now be a national government empowered for the first time
to suppress insurrections, and therefore capable of putting down
slave revolts. In his August 8 "curse of heaven" speech,
Gouverneur Morris asked rhetorically, "And What is the proposed
compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every princi-
ple of right, of every impulse of humanity. They are to bind them-
selves to march their militia for the defense of the S. States; for
their defence agst those very slaves of whom they complain." 35 The
year 1787 thus marks the occasion-the first-of formal national
complicity in the maintenance of the institution of slavery. 6
What, in the end, may be said about the Constitution and
human freedom? Is it possible that the adoption of a national Con-
stitution in fact doomed the institution of slavery? Is it possible
that the Constitution, which at critical points both acquiesced in
and facilitated slavery, contained in its larger philosophy of gov-
ernment the seeds of slavery's demise? What I mean to suggest is
that the Constitution both drew upon and helped create a concep-
tion of republican government with which slavery was inherently
incompatible. The Constitution was in this sense a document at
war with itself.
The creation of a government that rested on the fundamental
premise of consent of the governed, and which had among its cen-
tral values human dignity and individual liberty, made slavery a
constitutionally variant institution even in 1787. The constitu-
tional institution of slavery became even more precarious when the
Bill of Rights was proposed by the first Congress and adopted by
the states. I mean this, in part, in a somewhat technical legal sense.
Consider, for example, the problems that would be posed for the
rendition of fugitive slaves if one were to take the Bill of Rights
seriously. The text of the Constitution certainly invites arguments
34. 3 Farrand, supra note 1, at 84 (letter from William Blount, Richard D. Spaight, and
Hugh Williamson to Governor Caswell, September 18, 1787).
35. 2 id. at 222.
36. For excellent accounts of the consideration of slavery at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, see D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-1820 (1979);
Finkleman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
188-225 (1987).
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that when a person of color present in a free state was alleged to be
a fugitive slave, he or she was entitled, under either the sixth or
seventh amendments to the Constitution, to a trial by jury, to the
right to confront witnesses, and to the right to be brought before
an article III judge if the proceedings were federal. Enforcement of
these rights would have rendered return of fugitives difficult, and
in some areas of the country impossible. Juries in the free states
often would have stood in the way of return. A powerful argument
could be made, moreover, that slavery could not constitutionally be
maintained in any of the territories of the United States after the
addition of the fifth amendment, which provided that "no person"
could be deprived of "liberty" by the federal government "without
due process of law.""7
Proslavery lawyers could, and did, marshall arguments on the
other side of these specific legal questions. Indeed, they could ar-
gue that the due process clause of the fifth amendment guaranteed
the slave owner's property right in his slaves against federal depri-
vation. They could argue, as Chief Justice Taney did in Dred Scott
v. Sandford, that the right to hold slaves was "distinctly and ex-
pressly affirmed in the Constitution" 8 -a clearly erroneous state-
ment-and that every debatable constitutional question should
therefore be resolved in favor of protecting the institution of slav-
ery, and that the powers granted to Congress, such as the power to
"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
...belonging to the United States""9 must be read to contain an
unstated exception precluding regulations that would limit slavery.
The fact that those who wrote the Constitution took great pains
never to speak slavery's name cuts against Taney's argument that
the Constitution should be read throughout in light of a principle
of affirmative approval of slavery. Efforts were in fact made at the
Convention to avoid any such sense of a generalized approval of
slavery. The fugitive slave clause, for example, was amended at the
end of the Convention to take out the phrase "a person legally
held to service in one state" and replace it with the phrase "a per-
37. U.S. CONST. amend V.
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1856).
39. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cL. 2.
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son held to service in one state under the laws thereof."40 The
change was made to avoid saying that anyone could lawfully be
held to slavery in any natural law sense, to avoid any suggestion of
constitutional approval, and to merely state the positive law fact
that some persons were held to service not "legally" but merely
"under the laws" of some states.4
When I refer to the incompatibility of slavery and the Constitu-
tion, moreover, I am referring not merely to the particular
problems of jury trials for fugitives, or the potential unconstitu-
tionality of slavery in the territories, but more fundamentally to
the deep conflict between slavery and the very nature of the kind
of polity the framers had created. In a sense, the failure of the
Founders was not that their Constitution accorded too little dig-
nity to "persons," but that they and their generation had a far too
constricted view of who was a person in the real sense.
My suggestion that slavery was fundamentally incompatible with
the principles underlying the Constitution resonates with Lincoln's
bold argument that slavery was incompatible with the philosophy
of the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln drew upon the Decla-
ration and the republican and libertarian principles of the found-
ing as he articulated his aspirational views in the great debates
with Judge Douglas in 1858. Appealing to "the better angels of our
nature, 42 Lincoln asked how his opponent and his audience could
reconcile slavery and the principles of America's foundational
covenants.
I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas
and his friends are not willing to stand by it, let them come up
and amend it. Let them make it read that all men are created
equal except negroes. Let us have it decided, whether the Decla-
ration of Independence, in this blessed year of 1858, shall be
thus amended. 43
40. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 628 (emphasis added).
41. According to Madison's notes, "the term 'legally' was struck out, and 'under the laws
thereof' inserted . . .in compliance with the wish of some who thought the term (legal)
equivocal, and favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view .. " Id.
42. Lincoln used this phrase in his First Inaugural Address. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 12 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
43. CREATED EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 81 (P. Angle
ed. 1958).
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Now Lincoln was a good enough lawyer to know that, notwith-
standing the sweeping language of the Declaration, its authors had
no intention in 1776 of freeing the slaves. No one thought that the
Declaration of Independence was an emancipation proclamation.
But Lincoln insisted on referring to the general principles of re-
publican liberty and equality embedded in the Declaration. He re-
fused to assume that the framers were simply being hypocritical in
proclaiming liberty and equality while acquiescing in slavery. And
perhaps he knew this greater truth. Perhaps he knew, in a phrase
uttered by Charles L. Black, Jr., in another context, that "hypoc-
risy may commit itself beyond easy retraction. . . . [Indeed,] .. .
it may turn out that what seemed hypocrisy was commitment all
the while; no more than persons do nations fully know their minds
all at once."44
A commitment to republican principles of government cannot be
cabined easily. If the framers adopted a Constitution that seemed
to strengthen slavery, they also gave us larger principles of govern-
ment that those who came later could invoke to set that institution
on the road to ultimate extinction.45
44. Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1103 (1986).
45. I would argue that nothing in the text of the original Constitution stood in the way of
national action abolishing or virtually abolishing slavery, even in the absence of the Civil
War amendments. I tested this proposition by asking on my 1987 constitutional law exam
the following hypothetical question:
The year is 1858. You are a young lawyer who has agreed to assist a candi-
date for the United States Senate from Illinois. The candidate is opposed to
slavery. If his party were to gain majority power in the Congress, he would
want the national government to do all that is constitutionally possible to
place slavery "on the path of ultimate extinction." He asks you to prepare a
memorandum that briefly summarizes the present constitutional status of slav-
ery and then suggests and analyzes every step the national government might
take, under the Constitution as it is now written in 1858, to limit, control, and
wherever possible to abolish slavery and the trade and commerce in slaves.
He assumes that it is unlikely that three-fourths of the states could be per-
suaded to ratify an amendment abolishing slavery [a very realistic assumption
in 1858]. That is why he wants to know what could be done by national legisla-
tion (or judicial decisions) under the existing Constitution if a majority of Con-
gress were determined to do all within its constitutional power to oppose slav-
ery. He is aware of the recent decision in Dred Scott holding, among other
things, that Congress lacks the power to abolish slavery in the territories. What
problems does that decision pose and what arguments could be made that it
was decided wrongly?
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Two aspects of the Constitutional founding that are unrelated to
human freedom have made an enduring contribution: the triumph
of national vision and the concept of constitutionalism itself. From
the vantage point of 1776, the Constitution that emerged from the
1787 convention was a truly extraordinary creation. 46 The coming
together of the American colonies into a single nation was more
difficult than we can now easily imagine. None of the revolutionary
leaders ever publicly contemplated erecting over all of America a
truly national government with the power to operate directly on
individuals.47 John Adams, at the time of the Continental Congress
in 1775, wrote to Abigail describing" '[f] ifty gentlemen meeting to-
gether all strangers. . . not acquainted with each other's language,
ideas, views, designs. They are therefore jealous [suspicious] of
each other-fearful, timid, skittish.' ",48 Although to us they stand
at a beginning, initiating a history, "they saw themselves as de-
fenders of a history accomplished; taking risks that might end,
rather than launch, a noble experiment."49 They came as repre-
Without fully exploring this question, let me simply suggest that the great national pow-
ers of Congress imminent in article I (as we have come to view them) would, properly read,
provide ample authority for Congress to bring a virtual end to slavery. The powers to raise
armies and to regulate the land and naval forces, for example, are one source of Congress'
authority to take slaves away from slave states. But all the power Congress might need
could be found in the commerce clause, which gives to Congress the power to regulate all
the economic activity that "affects more states than one," to use the phrase from Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. ( 9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Congress not only could have forbidden slavery in the
territories and in the District of Columbia, it also could have forbidden the interstate trans-
portation or sale of slaves. And it could have forbidden the interstate transportation or sale
(or international export) of any and all products produced by slave labor, or by any farm or
factory that utilized slave labor. After all, the Congress was able to preclude the interstate
shipment of goods made under conditions of "wage slavery"; that is, goods produced by
those paid less than a congressionally specified minimum wage. United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941). It could therefore surely use the commerce power to preclude the shipment
of goods made by actual slaves. The objection to this use of the commerce power would no
doubt be that Chief Justice Taney was right that an implicit constitutional commitment to
slavery precluded any clause from being read to permit the curtailing of slavery. I am simply
arguing against this reading. I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that a congres-
sional abolition of slavery was even remotely a historically realistic possibility in 1858; I am
only arguing that abolition by Congress would have been consistent with the text of the
original Constitution as it has come to be interpreted in modern decisions.
46. Wood, supra note 9, at 4.
47. Id.
48. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, quoted in G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA:
JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 34 (1978).
49. Id. at 38.
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sentatives of legislative assemblies nearly a century old that had
been more trading rivals than partners and had fought the war as
allies, not as a union.
From this uneasy alliance of simple state governments, the fram-
ers forged a powerful new national government, continental in
scope, with the authority not only to create its own armies, but to
operate directly on individuals, to regulate commerce, and for the
first time to impose taxes directly on citizens. They created a con-
stitution that unmistakably made this powerful new national gov-
ernment supreme, and said so in terms unmistakable and ad-
dressed directly to state court judges who would be on oath to
support it: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the. United States
. . . made in Pursuance thereof. .. shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding." 50 The federalist vision was best expressed
by John Marshall two decades later in McCulloch v. Maryland, in
which he imagined that "[t]hroughout this vast republic, from the
St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, revenue is to be collected and
expended, armies are to be marched and supported. 51 To this end
"[t]he sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no in-
considerable portion of the industry of the nation are entrusted to
its government. '5 2
For some, the federalist vision was one of the grandeur and im-
portance of the American nation. For Madison, the extended
American republic was also a means by which the rights of individ-
uals could gain some measure of protection from the force of ma-
jority sentiments. The proper remedy for tyranny by the majority,
as Madison wrote in the familiar tenth Federalist, was to extend
the governing republic across the entire nation.5 3 This way, poten-
tially vicious local majorities would be submerged in a larger na-
tion, and their danger lessened. He wrote: "The influence of fac-
tious leaders may kindle a flame within particular States, but will
be unable to spread a general conflagration through other
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
51. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819).
52. Id. at 407.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 12, at 63-64.
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
States. 54 A religious sect might control one State, but not a conti-
nental nation. "In the extent and proper structure of the Union,
therefore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases most
incident to Republican Government."55 Because the framers had
set us on the road to nationhood-and because they had provided
a mechanism for constitutional change that permitted the notion
of who counted as a person and a citizen to be expanded through
the Civil War amendments-we were, far too late in our history to
be a cause for unabashed celebration, able as a nation to bring na-
tional standards of justice and equality to bear on those areas
where legal inequality reigned.
However unintended or unanticipated it might have been,
Madison's idea of the extended republic as a source of national
amelioration of the local tyranny that might be practiced by local
majorities can be seen at work in the civil rights movement in the
American South. The triumph of nationalism was a precedent to
that movement, as was the notion of constitutionalism itself, the
idea that government must be guided not by whim, preference, or
raw power, but by the necessity of justifying its actions in terms of
previously agreed upon principles, binding even on government
itself.
All these themes come together for me in one moment of our
constitutional history, in Montgomery, Alabama, in the winter of
1955. Mrs. Rosa Parks had been convicted and fined for violating
the city's segregation code after refusing to give up her bus seat for
a white man. The next day the historic Montgomery bus boycott
was under way, and late in the afternoon, Dr. Martin Luther King,
then only twenty-six years old and recently arrived in the city, ac-
cepted the presidency of the boycotting organization, the Mont-
gomery Improvement Association. He was to address the first mass
meeting of the movement that night, and he had only twenty min-
utes to prepare. What kind of argument does one make in that
setting to show the wrongness of the "preferences" of those with
majority power, and the rightness of the cause of the local minor-
ity? The best of the American constitutional tradition provided Dr.
King with a kind of argument that is not available in many of the
54. Id. at 64.
55. Id. at 65.
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world's political cultures. This is what he said to thousands packed
inside and outside the Holt Street Baptist Church on that Novem-
ber night:
If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong.
If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong.
If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong."
My whole point comes down to this: the drafting of the Consti-
tution in the Grand Federal Convention in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787 did not mark the creation of a just and democratic
society, but only the beginning of a quest not yet complete.
56. Address by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Montgomery, Alabama (Dec. 5, 1955), quoted
in S. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND 71 (1982).
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